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Abstract 
This paper examines demonstrative pronouns used as deictics to refer to the inter- 
- - 
pretation of one or more clauses. Although this usage is frowned upon in style manuals 
such as (Strnnk and White, 1959), who say 
"This.  The pronoun this, referring to the complete sense of a preceding 
sentence or clause, cannot always carry the load and so may produce an 
imprecise statement." 
it is nevertheless very common in written text. Handling this usage poses a problem 
for Natural Language Understanding systems. The solution I propose is based on dis- 
tinguishing between what can be pointed to and what can be referred to  by virtue of 
pointing. I argue that a restricted set of discourse segments yield what such demon- 
strative pronouns can point to in the discourse model and a restricted set of what 
Nunberg (1979) has called referring functions yield what they can refer to by virtue of 
that pointing. 
short  title: Discourse Deixis 
1 Introduction 
1.1 The Phenomenon 
This paper sets out to explicate a use of demonstrative pronouns illustrated in the following 
examples: 
Example 1 
It's always been presumed that when the glaciers receded, the area got very hot. 
The Folsum men couldn't adapt, and they died out. That's what is supposed to 
have happened. It's the textbook dogma. But it's wrong. 
Example 2 
Using microscopes and lasers and ultrasound, he removes tumors that are inter- 
twined with children's brain stems and spinal cords. There is only the most minute 
visual difference between the tumors and normal tissue. Operations can last 12 
hours or more. The tiniest slip can kill, paralyze or leave a child mentally retarded. 
This  is the easy part of his job. (New York Times, 11 August 1990, p.27) 
In these examples, a demonstrative pronoun is used to refer to  something other than the 
referent of a previous noun phrase. It  is not, however, referring to a previous section of text 
- what Lyons (1977, p.668) has called pure textual deixis - as in, 
Example 3 
A: The combination is 7-4-1-5. 
B: I'm sorry I didn't hear you. Could you repeat that? 
In Example 1, the referent of that must be something that can happen. In Example 2, it 
must be something that can be part of a job. Sections of text - i.e., strings of words - can 
be neither. On the other hand, sections of text can have such events or actions associated 
with them. My goal in this paper is thus straightforward: to show how sections of text can 
yield referents for demonstrative pronouns. 
The paper proceeds as follows: First I discuss terminology and assumptions. I then 
try to  show (Section 2.1) that it is not any arbitrary sequence of clauses in a text that 
can yield referents for demonstrative pronouns, but rather, only those that correspond to 
what have been called discourse segments in many current discourse theories. I then try 
to show that,  a t  any point in the text, only certain discourse segments can yield referents 
for demonstrative pronouns - in particular, only those segments whose contribution to  the 
discourse model is currently i n  focus. 
To make this sense of focus precise, I present in (Section 2.3) a simple incremental tree 
construction algorithm which is meant to serve as a formal analogue for text processing. 
This algorithm specifies precisely (1) the positions at which new nodes can be inserted 
into a tree and (2) the particular insertion operations that can be used. I then associate 
with these positions (the current right frontier of the tree) the set of discourse segments 
whose contribution to the discourse model is i n  focus. I claim that it is just these discourse 
segments that can yield referents for demonstrative pronouns. In support of this claim, I 
provide empirical evidence (Section 3) that segments corresponding to nodes no longer on 
the right frontier can no longer provide such referents. 
Thirdly, I argue against the view that it is the structure of the world rather than how 
a speaker chooses to describe it that is the primary constraint on what deictic pronouns 
can refer t o  in discourse. I conclude in Section 4 with a description of the indirect process 
by which I believe discourse segments yield referents for demonstrative pronouns through 
their contribution to the discourse model. This process draws on Nunberg's exploration 
into polysemy and demonstrative reference (Nunberg, 1979) and current theories of what 
has been called natural language metaphysics (Bach, 1989). 
1.2 A Name for the Phenomenon 
Phenomena need names. Lyons, recognizing the difference between pure textual deixis (see 
above) and the phenomenon under discussion here, called this phenomenon impure textual 
deixis. It  was "deixis" because 
The term 'deixis' (which comes from a Greek word meaning "pointing" or "in- 
dicating") is now used in linguistics to refer to the function of personal and 
demonstrative pronouns, of tense and of a variety of other grammatical and lex- 
ical features which relate utterances to the spatio-temporal co-ordinates of the 
act of utterance. (Lyons, 1977, p.636) 
It  was "textual" because it had to do with the utterance itself, and "impure" because what 
was being indicated was not the utterance as a thing but what it expressed. 
I think a better name is called for. The terms reference to  events and reference to  
propositions used by Bauerle (1989) reflect the semantic sort of the thing referred to. My 
problem with these terms are that (1) events and propositions are only two of the many 
sorts of things that demonstrative pronouns can refer to in discourse and (2) the separate 
names may be seen as implying that there are separate processes involved in reference to 
events and in reference to propositions. I do not believe this. I try to show here that only a 
single process need be involved. Another possible name is discourse deixis, previously used 
by Lakoff (1974). This is the name I favor: it labels the phenomenon as an instance of 
deixis, and grounds the source of its referents in the discourse. 
As for a name for the referring phrases, when Lyons begins his discussion of this and that, 
he uses the locution the English demonstratives 'this' and 'that1, used as deictics (Lyons, 
1977, p. 655) acknowledging the fact that demonstrative pronouns are used for other func- 
tions as well. Shortly thereafter, he contracts this locution to deictic pronoun - 
In so far as the very fact of pointing to something commits the person who is 
pointing to a belief in the existence of what he is pointing at, the use of a deictic 
pronoun carries with it the implication or presupposition of existence. (Lyons, 
1977, p. 656) 
One reason for promoting this phrase is that it turns out that in several languages, including 
Italian and even English, zero-pronouns ( 0 )  can be used in the same way as demonstrative 
pronouns. (See Di Eugenio (1989) for a discussion of discourse deixis in Italian.) In English, 
this occurs in instructions, where it is common to find ellipsed direct-objects (Sadock, 1974). 
However, the referent of this ellipsis need not be a physical object. Consider the following 
example drawn from a Frigidaire assembly and repair manual 
Example 4 
Check the door seal by closing the door on a 1" wide strip of paper. A slight drag 
should be felt when the paper is pulled from between the gasket and the cabinet. 
Repeat 0 around all four sides of the door. 
Here the zero-pronoun refers to the process described in the preceding section of text.lThis 
reference would ordinarily be achieved explicitly using a demonstrative - "Repeat this (or 
this process) around all four sides of the door." Thus the term deictic pronoun can serve 
to denote any pronoun (zero-pronoun, demonstrative pronoun, or even personal pronoun) 
that serves this same function. 
1.3 Terminology and Other Assumptions 
I assume that in processing a text, a listener is constructing a model that supports it and that 
evolves with the text. Lyons (1977, p.670) has called this model the universe-of-discourse. I 
and others have called it a discourse model. A discourse model is clearly a mental construct, 
but as long as the participants in a discourse believe they understand one another, they 
assume that their models are consistent. Discourse models may correspond to particulars 
of the real world, if the real world is the subject of the discourse, but they need not. (This 
is not to say that people do not use their beliefs about the real world and how it works, 
in interpreting texts and constructing discourse models. It just says that the particulars of 
the two need not be the same. The only thing essential for successful discourse is that the 
participants believe their models are consistent with one anothers'.) 
A discourse model contains entities to which are ascribed the properties and relation- 
ships predicated of them in the text. (Bill Woods once referred to them as "conceptual 
coathooks".) More sober names that have been used include discourse referents (Kartun- 
nen, 1976), reference markers (Kamp, 1981), and file cards (Heim, 1983). I have called them 
discourse entities (Webber 1979, 1982), and will continue to do so in this paper. Discourse 
entities ground referring phrases. They may or may not correspond to particular entities in 
the real world. 
As in many recent theories of discourse including Discourse Representation Theory 
( D R q  (Kamp, 1981; Bauerle, 1989; Roberts, 1989), Grosz and Sidner's theory of discourse 
(1986) and that of Polanyi (1986), I assume that a discourse model is structured into regions 
in a way that reflects the recent structure of the evolving text. Utterances seen as part of 
the same segment of text (for any of the reasons noted in Section 2.1) will be taken by the 
listener to contribute to the same region of the model.2 Likewise, clauses in the text that 
are understood as contributing to the same region of the model will be seen as part of the 
same segment of text. Regions of the model may be embedded in other regions, reflecting 
substructures in the text. In DRT, these regions corresponds to contexts. As in recent work 
in DRT (Asher, 1987; Bauerle, 1989), I assume that each context has a discourse entity that 
"stands proxy" for its propositional content. This discourse entity will come into play in 
Section 4, when I explain how discourse segments can indirectly yield referents for deictic 
pronouns through their associated regions of the discourse model. 
Like Nunberg (1979) and others, I assume an approach to ostensive acts (such as in 
the use of deictic pronouns) that distinguishes what is pointed to (the demonstraturn), and 
what is referred to (the referent). These two entities may be the same, but they do not 
have to be. What is of interest is the link between them, which Nunberg (1979) has called 
a referring function. Referring functions apply to demonstrata to produce referents. In the 
approach that I present in Section 4, referring functions apply to discourse entity "proxies" 
for regions of the discourse model corresponding to discourse segments, thereby yielding 
referents for deictic pronouns. The range of possible referents follows directly from the 
range of referring functions possible in a given circumstance. In the following example, at  
least four are possible: 
Example 5 
Hey, management has reconsidered its position. They've promoted Fred to second 
vice president. 
(a.) That's a lie. 
(b) . That 's false. 
(c.) That's a funny way to describe the situation. 
(d.) When did that happen? 
In (a), the referenced interpretation is the specific speech act (only speech acts can be 
lies); in (b), the proposition conveyed by the segment; in (c) the description expressed by 
the segment; and in (d), the particular event denoted by the segment. Since in the rich 
ontology advocated by Bach (1990) and others, all of these are sorts of individuals, I take it 
that the act of ostension performed by deictic pronouns in discourse can add new discourse 
entities into the model that were not present prior to the ostensive act. As such, ostension 
can have the same effect as what has been called accommodation (Lewis, 1979). 
That is, in the simplest case, a referring phrase is taken to refer to  an entity already in 
the discourse model. However, it can also cause the listener to add a new entity to the model 
to which s/he can ascribed the indicated properties or can set in the indicated relations. 
The addition of a new entity in response to an indefinite noun phrase is a common case. 
Where new entities are added in response to definite noun phrases, the process has been 
called accommodation because the use of a singular definite is felt to presuppose that there 
is already an unique entity in the context with the given description that will allow a truth 
value to be assigned to the utterance. For example, 
Example 6 
I walked up to the first house on my list. I noticed that the side door was wide 
open. 
Houses do not necessarily have side doors. However, in response to "the side door", the 
listener accommodates a new entity in his/her discourse model corresponding to the men- 
tioned side door of the house in question ("mentioned", because the text is consistent with 
there being more than one side door). Deictic pronouns can have the same effect as such 
definite noun phrases. 
Finally, I assume that one can identify (at least, a postemom') what a speaker and lis- 
tener are attending to - what is immediately salient - at any point in the discourse. Items 
so identified are considered in focus, although other terms have been used to distinguish 
particular theories. Notions of focus have been proposed, at least in part, to account for 
patterns of "efficient" concept verbalization - for example, when the pronunciation of con- 
cept descriptions can be attenuated, when concepts can be specified using explicit pronouns 
or zero-anaphors, when an unmodified definite noun phrase can be used to refer to a concept, 
when particular intonation structures and/or marked syntactic constructions like clefts are 
appropriate, etc. Among the sorts of things that are felt to be able to have some sort of 
"focussed" status are discourse entities (Grosz et al., 1983; Sidner, 1982), open propositions 
(Wilson and Sperber, 1979; Prince, 1986; Steedman, 1990), and "focus spaces" (Reichman, 
1985; Grosz and Sidner, 1986). 
I will use the notion of focus to distinguish those regions of the discourse model that, at 
a given point in the discourse, can yield referents for deictic pronouns. The main feature of 
focus that is relevant here is that it changes in fairly predictable ways, as each new clause 
structure m 
structure produces - 
Figure 1: Three Relevant Structures 
is processed. 
While I will discuss focus with respect to which regions of the model can yield referents 
for deictic pronouns, when there is more than one, as in the following minimal pair, I will 
have nothing to say here about how the choice between them is made. 
Example 7 
a. Segal, however, had his own problems with women: he had been trying to keep 
his marriage of seven years from falling apart; when that became impossible . . . 
b. Segal, however, had his own problems with women: he had been trying to keep 
his marriage of seven years from falling apart; when that became inevitable . . . 
In Example 7a. , it is the region associated with "(Segal's) keeping his marriage of seven 
years from falling apart" that yields a referent for that, while in Example 7b., it is that 
associated with "his marriage of seven years falling apart" that does so. 
1.4 For the Record 
It is important for the reader to be clear that there are three structures under discussion 
here (Figure 1): the structure of the text (in terms of discourse segments), the structure 
of the discourse model (in terms of regions), and a tree structure which, by virtue of its 
associated insertion procedure, serves as a fonnal record of the process by which the discourse 
model grows and the structure changes, in response to the text and its perceived structure. 
The value of having such a formal analogue lies in being able to make use of its properties, 
including how it can legally change over time, to pin things down and avoid hand-waving. (In 
Section 2.4, I discuss what I believe is the close relationship between these three structures 
and those proposed by Grosz and Sidner.) 
I should also note that there this is not the first attempt to provide an account of 
demonstrative pronouns in discourse (nor do I expect it will be the last). Both Linde (1979) 
and Sidner (1983) tried to extend theories of anaphoric pronoun interpretation to account 
for demonstrative pronouns as well. Both these accounts are in terms of the focus status of 
different objects and actions mentioned in the discourse. More recently though, Passoneau 
(1989) analyzed 678 instances of it and that found in conversational interactions, where 
these pronouns are interpreted as referring to entities introduced into the discourse model 
by noun phrases and other sentential constituents. She found two independent factors that 
strongly predicted whether subsequent reference would be via it or via that: one she called 
persistence of grammatical subject, the other, persistence of grammatical form. By the first 
factor, if both antecedent and pronoun were subjects of their respective clauses, the pronoun 
it was strongly favored. By the second factor, if the antecedent noun phrase was other 
than a pronoun or a canonical noun phrase headed by a noun, then the pronoun that was 
strongly favored. Unlike the current study, Passoneau's analysis is limited to pronouns 
whose antecedents were constituents within single sentences. 
There are also at least two attempts to extend Kamp's Discourse Representation Theory 
(1981) to handle the phenomenon of reference to events and to propositions (Bauerle, 1988; 
Asher, forthcoming), but as I will try to show, it is more than just events and propositions 
that deictic pronouns can refer to in discourse, so that a richer interpretive process is called 
for. 
2 Discourse Segments 
2.1 Background 
I hope that a simple example will convince the reader that not every previous sequence of 
clauses in a text can yield referents for deictic pronouns. Consider the following: 
Example 8 
a. For his part in their joint project, John built a two-armed robot. 
b. He had learned about robotics in CSE391. 
c. For her part, Mary taught it how to play the saxophone. 
It is easy to come up with an subsequent utterance in which the referent of that derives from 
just the previous clause (c), for example 
d. That took her six months. 
It is also easy to come up with a subsequent utterance in which the referent of that derives 
from the previous three clauses (a-c), for example 
d'. That earned them both As. 
However, it does not seem possible to come up with a subsequent utterance in which the 
referent of that derives from just the previous two clauses (b-c). This fact seems to follow 
from the fact that they are not interpreted together as a unit, independent of a. 
If not every sequence of clauses in a text has an interpretation accessible to deictic 
reference, which ones do? There is a widely held view that discourses are formed of smaller 
sequences of related clauses or sentences called discourse segments, although as James Allen 
has noted: 
. . .there is little consensus on what the segments of a particular discourse should 
be or how segmentation could be accomplished. One reason for this lack of 
consensus is that there is no precise definition of what a segment is beyond the 
intuition that certain sentences naturally group together (Allen, 1987, pp. 398-9) 
Among the bases that have been proposed for grouping utterances into segments are: com- 
mon conversation role (Hinds, 1979; Fox, 1987); common discourse purpose with respect to 
a speaker's plans (Grosz & Sidner, 1986); common meaning (Hobbs, 1988); common per- 
spective in describing a single event (Nakhimovsky, 1988), and common modality (Roberts, 
1989). As for what constitutes a minimal discourse segment, theories differ. Hobbs (1988) 
takes it to  be a sentence, and Polanyi (1986), a clause. Grosz and Sidner (1986) seem to take 
a sentence as the minimal segment needed to express a single purpose, but unlike Hobbs 
and Polanyi do not assume that every sentence constitutes a distinct discourse segment. 
Characterizing what is involved in recognizing that utterances share a common subject, 
viewpoint, modality and/or purpose (and doing so in a manner amenable to computer 
implementation) is both an unsolved problem and an active area of research. To date, 
particular lexical and syntactic cues have been identified as signalling segmental changes 
(Cohen,1987; Grosz and Sidner,1986; Nakhimovsky, 1988; Reichman, 1985), as have specific 
intonational changes at  segment boundaries (Hirschberg and Litman, 1987). 
That is not the whole story, however. Also needed is a characterization of how listeners 
bring their beliefs about the world and about speakers' intentions to bear on recognizing 
common subject or purpose, since this cannot be done on the basis of surface and syntactic 
cues alone. Here there are fewer research results to date. For this paper, I will have to 
assume, like Cohen (1987), the existence of an oracle that can decide with which, if any, 
existing segment the next utterance in a text shares a common subject, viewpoint, etc. 
If doing so leads the reader to abandon the paper at this point, so be it. My feeling is 
that existing evidence that discourse segments play a role in text understanding makes 
it worthwhile to continue, in parallel, efforts at  characterizing recognition procedures and 
efforts like the present one that assume such recognition. 
What roles have discourse segments been seen to play in discourse understanding? One 
early computational reason for appealing to the notion of discourse segment was as a domain 
of locality for definite noun phrases (Grosz, 1977, 1981), t o  account in part for the fact that 
the same definite noun phrase may refer to different discourse entities a t  different points in 
the discourse. The claim is that a definite noun phrase would be interpreted as referring to 
an entity mentioned in the same segment rather than one mentioned anywhere else, even 
if the latter were mentioned more recently. For example, consider the following sequence 
uttered by a single speaker: 
Example 9 
a. Do you think I can borrow your tent? 
b. The one I took on my last hike leaked, 
c. and I haven't had time to replace it. 
d. I would of course have the tent cleaned before returning it to  you. 
By the tent in sentence Sd, the speaker is referring to  the one she has requested in 9a, and 
not the leaky one she has mentioned in 9b-c. This can be explained in terms of discourse 
segments, by saying that clauses 9b-c make up a segment embedded in the larger one (9a- 
d). As a whole, the segment constitutes a request, with 9b-c functioning as its explanation. 
Because 9d is outside the embedded segment, its object noun phrase the tent  would be 
interpreted as referring to the one mentioned in the segment that it belongs to (i.e., the 
outer one). 
Another use to  which the notion of discourse segment has been put is in the interpretation 
of tensed clauses in narrative text (Nakhimovsky, 1988; Webber, 1988). For example, the 
unmarked interpretation of a sequence of simple past tense clauses in English narrative is 
that the events described happen at the same time or in temporal sequence. But this is not 
always the case, as in the following example. 
Example 10 
a. I was over a t  Mary's house yesterday. 
b. She told me about her brother Harold. 
c. He went to  Alaska with two friends. 
d.  Together they climbed Mt. McKinley. 
e. She asked me whether I was interested in going some time. 
Clearly the event described in clauses c-d happened before the event described by a,b and 
el even though all the clauses use the same simple past tense. Postulating an embedded 
segment and a temporal focus that can reset at  segment boundaries (Webber, 1988) allows 
one t o  retain a notion of simple simultaneity or temporal progression in the unmarked case. 
2.2 Relations between Discourse Segments 
Often (as above) discourse segments are taken to be recursive structures, such that either a 
discourse segment is a minimal segment or it comprises a sequence of embedded discourse 
 segment^.^ As so defined, the recursive structures of interest are trees. This does not mean 
that a discourse corresponds to  a single tree, just that there may be parts of the discourse 
that evince an embedding structure, and that this structure has interesting properties. 
Now, if a tree structure is t o  represent the relationship among (certain) segments, then 
so must its two basic structuring relations - parent-of and right-sibling-of. For example, 
in Robin Cohen's work on the structure of argumentative discourse (Cohen, 1983, 1987), 
parent-of means that the claim made by the child provides evidence for the claim made by 
the parent. Right-sibling-of corresponds to the linear order of claims that provide evidence 
for the same conclusion. Cohen's goal is to  understand how structured arguments are 
transmitted through a linear sequence of clauses. She presents three common transmission 
forms that enable minimal effort reconstruction of the structure underlying an argument: 
pre-order, post-order and a mixed pre- and post-order. These tramission forms require 
minimal effort because of the severe restrictions they place on what an incoming clause can 
stand in a parentlchild or sibling relation to. Cohen shows how "clue words" can be used 
to provide enough information to enable departures from these expected transmission forms 
and still produce comprehensible arguments. 
In Scha and Polanyi's proposal (1988) for a semi-deterministic, on-line procedure for 
building a structural description of an unfolding discourse, they take the nodes of discourse 
structure trees to  be any of a variety of types of discourse constituent units or DCUs. Dis- 
course constituent units differ from one another in two ways: (a) how they derive their 
semantic attributes from those of their constituents, and (b) the "accessibility" of their 
constituents to things like anaphoric reference. (The three types of DCU discussed in (Scha 
and Polanyi, 1988) are subordinations, binary coordinations, and n-ary coordinations, each 
of which has several subtypes. For example, lists and narratives are types of n-ary coordina- 
tions.) For all these node types, parent-of means uniformly that one DCU is a constituent 
of another one. However, the meaning of right-sibling-of varies, depending on the type of 
common parent node. For example, right-sibling-of in a narrative n-ary coordination has a 
temporal aspect to  its meaning, which it doesn't in a list n-ary coordination. 
Grosz and Sidner (1986) take a more abstract criterion for establishing structural rela- 
tions in discourse. The parent-of relation they call domination (DOM), and the right-sibling- 
of relation, satisfaction-precedes. They take these relations t o  hold between what they call 
discourse segment purposes or DSPs, rather than between discourse segments directly. A 
Figure 2: Growing a Binary Search 'Ikee 
segment's DSP specifies how it contributes to achieving the overall discourse purpose. If 
the DSP of one segment serves to satisfy that of another, the latter dominates (or stands in 
a parent-ofrelation to) the former. If one DSP must be satisfied before another (in satisfy- 
ing some larger purpose), than the former satisfaction-precedes the latter (or, alternatively, 
the latter is the right-sibling-of the former). Grosz and Sidner call the resulting hierarchy 
of DSPs the Intentional Structure of a discourse. It  is only one of three structures that 
they associate with a discourse. Another of the three, Attentional State, I will discuss in 
Section 2.4. 
2.3 Incremental Tree Construction 
Having specified the two tree-structuring relations parent-of and right-sibling-of, there is 
still a variety of ways that a tree can be grown incrementally from elements added to it 
in sequence, depending on the insertion operator(s) used and the nodes that insertion can 
apply to. Here I will show how the same initial tree and input sequence result in two different 
final trees, by different employing insertion operations. 
First consider a  bin^ y Search ~e (a tree with a maximum of two branches on each 
node and a restriction that (1) the value of any node on a left subtree is less than the value of 
its root and (2) the value of any node on a right subtree is greater than the value of its root). 
Here there are two simple operators attach as left daughter and attach as right daughter, 
where the position at  which a new node is attached depends on how its value compares with 
the values of existing nodes on a path from root to leaf. These operators can insert new 
nodes only at  the finge of the tree. Thus the root of the tree can never change, nor can 
the relation between any existing node and the root. (Figure 2 illustrates the incremental 
change in a BST as two new elements, whose values are 50 and 25, are added in sequence.) 
Now consider another data structure, the AVL tree. An AVL tree must satisfy the 
Figure 3: Growing an AVL Tree 
same constraints as a BST, as well as one additional constraint: an AVL tree must be kept 
balanced around each node. (A tree is considered balanced if the heights of its left and right 
subtree do not differ by more than one.) Again, new nodes can only be added at the fringe 
of the tree, but the insertion operations are more complex, often leading to a restructuring 
of the tree (via rotation) to keep it balanced. (See (Reingold and Hansen, 1983) or any 
standard text in data structures, for more detailed discussion.) Figure 3 illustrates the 
incremental change in the same initial tree - which also qualifies as an AVL tree - as the 
same two elements, 50 and 25, are added in sequence. Notice that the root node of the 
AVL has changed by virtue of the insertions, as has the fringe and the right frontier. (The 
right frontier of a tree comprises those nodes along the path from root to tip defined by the 
sequence of rightmost daughters, starting at the root.) 
No one has claimed that Binary Search Trees or AVL trees are relevant to discourse 
understanding. However, they can provide a basis for understanding other procedures that 
have been proposed for discourse understanding. For example, Cohen's pre-order trans- 
mission form (Cohen, 1983, 1987) uses a single operation - attach as rightmost daughter. 
Her post-order transmission format makes use of a different operation - attach as parent - 
which subordinates a node or set of nodes as daughters of the node corresponding to the 
new clause. Her hybrid strategy makes use of both operators. At any point, there is a set of 
nodes that these operators can apply to. When an operator applies, it may change the tree 
such that different nodes are available as points of attachment. As noted, Cohen allows for 
linguistic clues to redirect operators to other nodes in the tree. 
What I want to propose is a somewhat different, incremental procedure that makes 
use of two operations - attach as rightmost daughter (or simply, attach) and adjoin. After 
describing the operators, where they apply, and how they change the shape of the evolving 
tree, I will try to explain in discourse terms what the two operators are meant to correspond 
to. I then offer evidence in Section 3 in support of the claim that it is regions of the discourse 
model corresponding to  nodes on the right frontier of a tree created by such a procedure 
Figure 4: Right Frontier 
that can yield referents for deictic pronouns. 
First, the operations. Attach is the simple operation attach as rightmost daughter dis- 
cussed previously. (Because nodes do not have explicit values as in the BST and AVL trees, 
I will label leaf nodes in the order of their incorporation and non-terminal nodes, with a 
list of their children in left-to-right order.) Adjunction is a somewhat more complex op- 
eration which creates new non-terminal nodes rather than just adding leaves to existing 
non-terminals. When a new node is adjoined to one already in the tree, both become chil- 
dren of the same (new) parent node, with the new one being the right-sibling of the old. As 
I will show in the next section, adjunction applies slightly differently to root, non-terminal 
and leaf nodes. However, it always adds two nodes to a tree, whereas attachment adds only 
one. 
In the procedure described here, attachment and adjunction are limited to nodes on the 
right frontier of the evolving tree structure. (In Figure 4, nodes on the right frontier are 
shaded.) If this were really an independent procedure I was describing, I would now have to 
specify how the choice would be made as to (a) where on the right frontier to add a new node 
and (b) how to do so (i.e., by attachment or adjunction). However, since my purpose is just 
to use the procedure to enable the reader to visualize what happens during text processing 
to the right frontier of this Discourse Structure (or DS) Tree, I will describe these choices 
in discourse terms. 
2.4 Discourse Segments and Incremental Tree Construction 
I will start by assuming a 1-to-1 mapping between discourse segments and tree nodes, with 
a clause constituting the minimal segment. When the next clause in a text is taken (for 
whatever reason mentioned in Section 2.1) to  be included in an existing discourse segment, 
Figure 5: Addition of Nodes by Attachment 
the corresponding tree operation is attachment of a new node at the node corresponding to 
that segment. For example, when the third clause is processed in the following example, it 
corresponds to a node being attached to the root of the same tree (Figure 5). 
Example 11 
1. John eats yoghurt for breakfast, 
2. Fred eats Cheerios, 
3. and Mary eats muffins. 
At the level of the discourse model, attachment means that the region of the discourse model 
comprising the entities, properties and relations conveyed by the new clause is included in 
the same region of the model as those associated with the rest of the segment. Both the 
entire region and the new subregion correspond to nodes on the right frontier of the current 
DS tree. It is these regions - ones corresponding to  nodes on the right frontier of the current 
DS tree - that will be taken to be in focus (cf. Section 1.3). 
Now for the discourse correlate of adjunction. When a discourse segment Si is taken 
as being directly embedded in another segment Sj, the assumption is that the former con- 
tributes directly to the meaning or purpose of the latter. Suppose clause C comes along, 
causing the listener to realize that it is not Si that contributes directly to Sj, but rather 
it is the combination of Si and C. That is, Si and C form a segment directly embedded 
in Sj. This is the discourse correlate of adjunction to a non-terminal or leaf node. If C is 
seen as contributing along with the top-level segment (corresponding to the current root of 
the tree) to some more encompassing meaning or purpose, this is the discourse correlate of 
adjunction to the root. The general case of adjunction to the root is shown in Figure 6. 
Discourse processing that correlates with adjunction to the root is actually a common 
case, since it happens whenever the meaning or purpose of the second clause in a discourse 
is taken to combine with that of the first clause to form a more encompassing meaning or 
purpose, such as when the second clause of Example 11 is processed. This simple common 
case of adjunction to the root is shown in Figure 7. 
To understand the discourse correlate of adjunction to a leaf node, consider the following 
text at the point at which the reader has finished processing the clause, "John hates snakes". 
Figure 6: Adjunction to  Root Node 
Figure 7: Adjunction to the root of a one-node tree 
Example 12 
a.  John hates snakes. 
b. His next-door neighbor had kept snakes, 
c. and he had hated his neighbors. 
In processing the second clause (12b), the reader may decide that it provides an explanation 
for the situation described in the first clause and that the two thereby constitute a segment. 
(This correlates with the adjunction to the root operation described above. It is shown in 
step 1 of Figure 8.) However, in processing the third clause (12c), the reader may recognize 
that i t  is the situation described jointly by b and c that explains the situation described 
in 12a. This re-analysis of the relationship between the situations conveyed by a and b 
correlates with the tree restructuring operation of adjunction to a leaf - in particular, to  the 
(a, (b,c)) (a, ((b,c),d)) 
step 1 step 2 
Figure 8: Adjunction Operations corresponding t o  Example 12 
16 
terminal on the right frontier. This second step corresponds to step 2 of Figure 8. Notice 
how the right frontier of the tree has changed, and thus which regions of the discourse model 
will be taken to be in  focus. 
Finally, to get a feel for the discourse correlate of adjunction to a non-terminal node, 
consider the following continuation of Example 12. 
Example 13 
a. John hates snakes. 
b. His next-door neighboor had kept snakes, 
c. and he had hated his neighbors. 
d. Later in college, his roommate had kept snakes. 
Having decided that it is the situation described in b-c that provides evidence for a, the 
reader in processing 13d. may decide that it is the combination of situations (one described 
in b-c, and the other described in d) that provides evidence for a. This reanalysis of the 
relationship between situations correlates with the tree restructuring operation of adjunction 
to  a non-terminal. This third step corresponds to step 3 of Figure 8. As in step 2, the right 
frontier of the DS tree has changed, and thus, the regions of the discourse model that are 
taken to be in  focus. 
Note that since operations only apply to the right frontier of the DS tree, the rest of 
the tree becomes irrelevant. In this light, one can easily suppose that the only segments of 
the discourse and regions of the discourse model that retain their identity are those that 
correspond to nodes on the right frontier. When they no longer do so, the only thing that 
needs to persist, for a listener to be said to have understood the discourse, are the entities, 
propositions and relations predicated of them. 
Finally note that a similar assumption - that integration of the discourse meaning of 
the next clause only takes place at the right frontier of the discourse structure - is made by 
Polanyi (1986) and Scha and Polanyi (1988). There is also a close relationship between the 
notion of right frontier presented here and Grosz and Sidner's (1986) stack of focus spaces 
representing Attentional State. 
In Grosz and Sidner's model (1986), a listener's attention at any point correlates with 
the perceived structure of the discourse. In particular, they associate a focus space with each 
discourse segment, as well as its discourse segment purpose (DSP). A focus space contains 
discourse entities, along with the properties and relations predicated of them. Corresponding 
to the evolving Intentional Structure (a tree of DSPs), they propose a stack of focus spaces 
which represents the listener's Attentional State. A segment's focus space is pushed on the 
stack when its DSP is taken to contribute to that of the segment whose focus space is at 
the top of the stack. Focus spaces will be popped from the stack prior to a push until the 
top focus space is one whose associated DSP can be taken to dominate that associated with 
the focus space about t o  be pushed. Another way to  put this is that the stack contains the 
focus spaces of segments whose "purposes" are still open to additional support. 
Drawing on Grosz's earlier work (Grosz, 1977, 1981), Attentional State serves as a struc- 
tured domain of locality for the interpretation of definite noun phrases. Resolution algo- 
rithms cam then prefer to  resolve a definite noun phrase against a referent in a focus space 
closer t o  the top of the stack than in one further down. Picking up a referent further down 
may, in fact, indicate that the segments associated with focus spaces higher up the stack 
can now to  be taken as "closed", with attention shifting back t o  a more inclusive segment. 
The right frontier of the DS Tree discussed here is closely related to  Grosz and Sid- 
ner's Attentional State. First, there is a simple mechanical relationship: Any directed path 
through a tree from root t o  leaf node can be mapped directly t o  a stack, with the element 
corresponding to the leaf a t  the top. Attach and adjoin then correspond exactly to  the sim- 
ple push and the sequence of pops followed by a push that Grosz and Sidner use to  manage 
the stack. (That is, attaching a new leaf node corresponds to  pushing a new element on the 
stack. Adjoining a new node Sk to a node Si corresponds to  popping all the stack elements 
through that corresponding to S, and pushing that corresponding to Sk onto the top of the 
stack.) 
There is also a functional relationship: nodes on the right frontier of the DS Tree correlate 
with regions of the discourse model taken to be in focus - substructures that resemble 
Grosz and Sidner's focus spaces. In fact, by positing a single tree structure and insertion 
algorithm to  serve as a formal analogue of both on-line recognition of discourse structure 
and changes in participants' attention on regions of the discourse model, one can eliminate 
Grosz and Sidner's stack as now redundant, while retaining their insight into the usefulness 
of distinguishing text structure, intentional structure and attentional state. 
3 The Referents of Deictic Pronouns 
The point of reviewing notions of discourse structure and incremental tree construction 
algorithms is t o  allow me to argue that it is only regions of the discourse model corresponding 
to nodes on the right frontier of the DS Tree - those regions that are in focus - that can 
yield referents for deictic pronouns. Before doing so, I want to demonstrate that i t  is the 
structure of discourse segments (and hence, that of the discourse model) that constrains the 
referents of deictic pronouns rather than the world being described. 
Evidence that the primary constraint on possible referents of the deictic pronouns is 
the presentation of information (not simply what that information is about) comes from 
the fact that,  presented differently, the same information about a situation gives rise to  
different referents. To see this, consider the following example, focussing on the referents of 
the deictic pronouns in paragraphs 2-4: 
Example 14 
1. There's two houses you might be interested in: 
2. House A is in Palo Alto. It's got 3 bedrooms and 2 baths, and was built in 1950. 
It's on a quarter acre, with a lovely garden, and the owner is asking $425K. But 
that 's all I know about it. 
3. House B is in Portola Vally. It's got 3 bedrooms, 4 baths and a kidney-shaped 
pool, and was also built in 1950. It's on 4 acres of steep wooded slope, with a view 
of the mountains. The owner is asking $600K. I heard all this from a real-estate 
friend of mine. 
4. Is that enough information for you to  decide which to look at? 
That in each case it is an immediately preceding segment that, through its contribution 
to the discourse model, yields the referent of the deictic pronoun, can be seen by presenting 
the same information in an interleaved fashion, a technique often used when comparing two 
items: 
Example 15 
1. There's two houses you might be interested in: 
2. House A is in Palo Alto, House B in Portola Vally. Both were built in 1950, 
and both have 3 bedrooms. House A has 2 baths, and B, 4. House B also has 
a kidney-shaped pool. House A is on a quarter acre, with a lovely garden, while 
House B is on 4 acres of steep wooded slope, with a view of the mountains. The 
owner of House A is asking $425K. The owner of House B is asking $600K. That's 
all I know about House A. This/That I heard from a real-estate friend of mine. 
3. Is that enough information for you to  decide which to look at? 
The two examples clearly have different segmental structures (at a gross level, one that 
corresponds to the structure of the paragraphs). The question that readers should ask 
themselves is whether the deictic pronouns in paragraphs 2-3 of Example 15 have the same 
referents as they do in Example 14. I believe they do not, and that this is because it is not 
the houses being referred to, but a distinct chunk of information one has been told about the 
houses. Example 15 does not contain separate segments describing what the speaker knows 
about house A and about house B. Rather, there is only one discourse segment containing 
information about both houses. The only deictic that refers easily and successfully is the 
final that, which successfully refers to the information conveyed about both houses through 
the entire segment. 
Another piece of evidence that it is focussed regions of the discourse model that yield 
referents for deictic pronouns comes from the (partially) recursive nature of discourse struc- 
ture (cf. Section 2.1). At any given point in a discourse, segments embedded at different 
depths can yield referents for deictic pronouns. To see this, consider the following quote 
from (Hillis, 1988): 
Example 16 
. . .  it should be possible to identify certain functions as being unnecessary for 
thought by studying patients whose cognitive abilities are unaffected by locally 
confined damage to the brain. {lFor example, binocular stereo fusion is known to 
take place in a specific area of the cortex near the back of the head. (2Patients 
with damage to this area of the cortex have visual handicaps but (3 [they] show no 
obvious impairment in their ability to think.3)2) Thisi suggests that stereo fusion 
. . 
is not necessary for t h o ~ g h t . ~ )  Thisj is a simple example, and the conclusion is not 
surprising. . . . (Hillis, 1988, p.185) 
(I have added brackets to indicate some of discourse segments at the points where deictic 
pronouns occur, with subscripts indicating the depth of embedding.) The most likely ref- 
erent for thisi is the fact that visual cortex-damaged patients have visual handicaps but no 
impairment to  their thinking abilities. This comes from Segment 2. The most likely referent 
for thisj is the whole "brain damage" example. This comes from the more inclusive Segment 
1. 
Not only do deictic pronouns get their referents from regions of the model corresponding 
to  nodes on the right frontier of the current DS Tree. These are the only regions that can 
provide such referents. Consider the following variation of Example 14. (Here, the individual 
clauses are numbered for later discussion.) 
Example 17 
(1) There's two houses you might be interested in: 
(2) House A is in Palo Alto. (3) It's got three bedrooms and two baths, and was 
built in 1950. (4) It's on a quarter acre, with a lovely garden, and (5) the owner is 
asking $425K. 
(6) House B is in Portola Vally. (7) It's got three bedrooms, four baths and a 
kidney-shaped pool, and (8) was also built in 1950. (9) It's on 4 acres of steep 
wooded slope, with a view of the mountains. (10) The owner is asking $600K. (11) 
I heard all this from a real-estate friend of mine. (12) But that's all I know about 
House A. 
(13) Is that enough information for you to decide which to look at? 
What is at issue is the referent of (unstressed) that in clause (12). The rest of the clause 
constrains the referent of that to be information about House A. However its position in the 
text is only compatible with its referring in one of three ways: 
It can co-refer with all this in clause ( l l ) ,  as in "But that's all she said." (In this 
paper, I do not discuss deictic pronouns that refer to NP-evoked entities.) 
It can refer to something associated with clause ( l l ) ,  such as its corresponding asser- 
{Info on 
both houses) 
9 
"But that's all I know ..." 
(Info on House A) {Info on House B] 
(2-5) (6-11) 
Figure 9: Discourse Segmentation at the point of processing "But that's all . . ." 
tion as in "Of course, that's what I always tell people." 
It can refer to something associated with clauses 2-11 (the information regarding both 
houses), similar to the perceived interpretation of that in clause 13. 
Schematically, one might represent the discourse segmentation at the point in the processing 
that roughly as in Figure 9. The oddity of Example 17 comes from the conflicting demands 
of text position and clause predication in the process of resolving that. 
Let me emphasize here that I am only considering written text and unstressed instances 
of this and that. It is well-known that stressing a pronoun can shift its preferred referent. In 
the case of clause (12), stressing that, reinforced by information conveyed by the rest of the 
sentence, can force its referent to be the block of information about House A, even though 
its corresponding region of the discourse model is no longer in focus. 
Notice that even if it is true that the referents of unstressed this and that must come 
from focussed regions of the model (ones corresponding to nodes on the right frontier of the 
DS Tree), there is still an ambiguity as to which region. To see this, consider the first part 
of the Hillis example (repeated here) as a "discourse completion task". 
Example 18 
. . . i t  should be possible to identify certain functions as being unnecessary for 
thought by studying patients whose cognitive abilities are unaffected by locally 
confined damage to the brain. For example, binocular stereo fusion is known to 
take place in a specific area of the cortex near the back of the head. Patients 
with damage to this area of the cortex have visual handicaps but show no obvious 
impairment in their ability to think. This . . . . 
At this point in the discourse, there are many possible ways of completing the last sentence, 
among them - 
Example 19 
a. This is obvious when they are asked to solve word problems presented orally. 
b. This suggests that stereo fusion is not necessary for thought. 
c. This is only a simple example, and the conclusion is not surprising. 
In (a), this refers to the fact that patients with damage to the area of the cortex near the 
back of the head show no obvious impairment in their ability to think. In (b) this must 
refer to the more inclusive claim that patients with damage to the particular area of the 
cortex near the back of the head have visual handicaps but show no obvious impairment in 
their ability to  think. (This is what shows that one doesn't need stereo fusion in order to 
think.) Finally, in (c) this clearly refers to the entire example about binocular stereo vision. 
Which discourse segment provides the referent for this depends on what is compatible with 
the meaning of the rest of the sentence, as I noted in Section 1.1, in connection with the 
following example: 
Example 20 
a. Segal, however, had his own problems with women: he had been trying to keep 
his marriage of seven years from falling apart; when that became impossible . . . 
that keeping his marriage from falling apart 
b. Segal, however, had his own problems with women: he had been trying to  keep 
his marriage of seven years from falling apart; when that became inevitable . . . 
that his marriage falling apart 
As with other types of ambiguity, there may be a default preference (e.g., based on recency, 
position, etc.) in a "neutral" context but, if there is one, it can easily be over-ridden by the 
demands of context (Crain & Steedman, 1985; Steedman, 1989). 
This ambiguity as to where a deictic pronoun takes its referent seems very similar to 
the ambiguity associated with the use of deixis for pointing within a shared physical con- 
text. Both Quine (1971) and Miller (1982) have observed in this regard that all pointing 
is ambiguous: the intended demonstratum of a pointing gesture can be any of the infinite 
number of points "intersected" by the gesture or any of the structures encompassing those 
points. The ambiguity here - how inclusive a region yields a referent for this or that - seems 
very similar. 
4 Referring Functions and the Interpretation of Deic- 
tic Pronouns 
Having set up what I hope is all the necessary groundwork in the previous three sections, I 
hope now to pull it together and show how deictic pronouns get their referents. The solution 
I propose is based on distinguishing between what can be pointed to (the demonstratum) 
and what can be referred to by virtue of pointing (the referent). I claim that it is focussed 
regions of the discourse model that deictic pronouns can point to (via the discourse entity 
"proxies" of those segments), and that it is possibly new discourse entities that they can 
refer to by virtue of that pointing. What links the two, I claim, are what Nurtberg (1979) 
has called referring functions. 
Nunberg (1979) introduces the notion of a referring function in connection with some 
rather extreme examples of demonstratum/referent pairs, such as in (17) below (Nunberg's 
numbering). 
For example, a restaurant waiter going off duty might remind his replacement: 
(16) The ham sandwich is sitting at table 20. 
And in just those contexts, he could equally well point at a ham sandwich and 
say, 
(17) He is sitting at  table 20. (Nunberg 1979, p.149) 
Here, the ham sandwich serves as the demonstratum of the pointing act and the guy who 
ordered the ham sandwich serves as the referent of the associated pronoun "he". Formally, 
referring functions map demonstrata into intended referents. 
where f is the referring function, D is the domain of demonstrata and R, the range of 
intended referents. The problem for the listener, given the ambiguity of pointing mentioned 
in Section 3, is to simultaneously constrain the demonstratum and the referring function, 
such that the intended referent results. 
Aiding the listener are factors that Nunberg takes as constraining the referring functions 
that can be used in a particular case. These include: 
that R, the range of the referring function, intersect "the set of things that the speaker 
might rationally be construed as intending to refer to in a given context", where the 
latter is determined by "the nature of the predication, by the morphology of the 
demonstrative pronoun, and by such contextual considerations at 'topic of conversa- 
tion"' (Nunberg, 1979, p.157); 
that it be possible for the listener to determine, in practice, just what stands in that 
relationship. (For example, if one wants to refer to a particular place by pointing to  a 
particular object, the listener should recognize what place is salient to that object. A 
wine bottle labelled "Medoc" may make the Medoc a salient place, while a bottle of 
Coca Cola may not make any place salient.) 
that it be a more likely referring function, under the circumstance, than any other. 
Similar assumptions are made by Hirschberg (1986) with respect to which scales a speaker 
can use to make scalar implicatures in a given case. 
To see that these assumptions make sense, consider the "ham sandwich" example given 
earlier. Here, R must intersect with males (given the pronoun "he") who are able to sit at 
a table (given the verb phrase). The listener can be expected to figure out which particular 
person stands in that relation, because it must be a man sitting at table 20. Finally, the 
circumstances of an order waiting in the kitchen to be delivered make it more likely that f 
is "the man who ordered the ham sandwich" than "the man who made it" 
I claim that the same approach can be extended to cover discourse deixis as well as 
external ostension, simply by taking a different domain D of demonstrata. Specifically, I 
noted in Section 1.3 that I was making the same assumption as that made in DRT (Asher, 
1987; Bauerle, 1989) that each context - region of the discourse model - has a discourse 
entity that "stands proxy" for its propositional content. If one takes D to comprise the 
discourse entity "proxies" of those regions of the discourse model that are currently in focus 
- those corresponding to (and whose discourse segments correspond to) nodes on the right 
frontier of the DS Tree, then everything else can proceed as before. 
To illustrate this approach, I will apply it to the first examples given in the paper 
(repeated here, with the initial clauses numbered). 
Example 21 
(1) It's always been presumed that (2) when the glaciers receded, (3) the area got 
very hot. (4) The Folsom men couldn't adapt, and (5) they died out. (6) That's 
what is supposed to have happened. It's the textbook dogma. But it's wrong. 
Example 22 
(1) Using microscopes and lasers and ultrasound, (2) he removes tumors (3) that are 
intertwined with children's brain stems and spinal cords. (4) There is only the most 
minute visual difference between the tumors and normal tissue. (5) Operations can 
last 12 hours or more. (6) The tiniest slip can kill, paralyze or leave a child mentally 
retarded. 
(7) This is the easy part of his job. (New York Times, 11 August 1990, p.27) 
First consider Example 21. Here at least four regions of the discourse model can be said 
to  be in focus a t  the point in the discourse a t  which that appears: 
the region associated with clause 5 
the region associated with clauses 4-5 
the region associated with clauses 2-5 
the region associated with clauses 1-5. 
Thus D ,  the domain of f ,  will comprise at least their four "proxies". R, the range of f ,  
should be a subset of event tokens (i.e., things that can happen). It is easy to  imagine a 
function that could apply to  each of the first three proxies t o  yield an event token, since 
their propositional content can be taken to convey a particular event. The intended referent 
could be any of these, but given the rest of the story (Tony Hillerman's Dance Hall of the 
Dead), i t  is probably either the second or third. 
Now consider Example 22. Here at least two regions of the discourse model can be said 
to  be in focus: 
the region associated with clause 6 
the region associated with clauses 1-6. 
Thus D will comprise at least their two proxies. I assume that it is intentional act types that 
are parts of jobs, so that R will intersect this set. I t  is hard to associate an intentional act 
type with the first proxy. (If clause 7 has been something like "This would paralyze some 
people into inaction.", where R would comprise (probably difficult) situations, it would be 
easier t o  associate such a referent with the first proxy.) So the intended referent of that in 
clause 7 most likely derives from applying f to  the second proxy - most likely paraphrasable 
as "removing these difficult tumors". 
Notice that this approach in terms of referring functions avoids a problem that Bauerle 
(1989) cannot, since he approach requires separate mechanisms t o  handle each of event 
token reference, event type reference and proposition (token) reference. That is, the current 
approach does not require introducing yet a fourth mechanism to handle deictic reference 
to  proposition types (not discussed in Bauerle's paper) such as the following: 
Example 23 
A: Fred and Amy always cheat on their homework. 
B: Well, I'd believe that of Fred, but not Amy. 
Finally, let me stress both the similarities and the differences between this account of 
discourse deixis and the process called accommodation, earlier mentioned in Section 1.3. 
Like accommodation, this account of discourse deixis postulates that new individuals - new 
entities in the discourse model - can be introduced by virtue of a referring action. These 
entities have the same status in the model as any introduced through the use of an indefinite 
noun phrase. That event tokens, event types, facts, descriptions, actions, etc. introduced 
this way can be individuals in their own right seems in line with the view gaining currency 
in formal semantics that the domain of the type individual has a very rich sub-structure 
(Bach, 1989; Link, 1983, 1985; Schubert & Pelletier, 1987). 
However, one should maintain a distinction between discourse deixis and the more gen- 
eral process of accommodation, since the former is more constrained. In accommodating a 
definite noun phrase, the discourse context must provide the listener with a discourse entity 
with which s/he can presume to associate a unique individual that satisfies the descriptive 
content of the noun phrase. Understanding definite noun phrases can thus be said to require 
all of a listener's world knowledge. Unlike a definite noun phrase however, a deictic pronoun 
has no descriptive content of its own. Thus what the discourse context must provide is a 
small set of entities that can be pointed to, whose propositional content is the source of new 
intended referents. Finding an appropriate referring function and intended referent in this 
case seems to be a less comprehensive task. 
5 Conclusion 
In this paper I have argued for an account of discourse deixis, based on current views of 
discourse structure. In particular, I argued that what provides referents for these expressions 
are the interpretations of discourse segments corresponding to nodes on the right frontier of 
a formal tree structure analogue. I also argued that the manner by which these expressions 
get their referents could be viewed as an extension of Nunberg's use of referring functions. 
For natural-language understanding systems, what lies ahead now is more work on discourse- 
level semantics, so that (1) systems can build appropriately structure discourse models in 
response to a text and (2) they can identify intended demonstrata and reference functions 
and thereby resolve this interesting class of referring forms. 
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1. Dick Oehrle has pointed out that these instructions literally specify five tests: it is 
only three additional repetitions that are needed. But how much in life would get 
done if people insisted on following instructions literally? 
2. It is not necessary to suppose that a particular sub-structure persists indefinitely. 
Later, in Section 2.4, I will note how long it is needed in order for the current approach 
to work. 
3. As Passonneau has pointed out (personal correspondence), this ignores the possibility 
of interpreting a stretch of text as belonging to two adjacent segments in a sequence, 
serving essentially as a transition between them. Including this possibility complicates 
what it would mean to have a sequence of discourse segments, but would not alter the 
recursive nature of the definition itself. 
4. I informally analyzed 177 consecutive instances of pronominal reference using it, this 
and that, distinguishing those that could be taken to co-refer with some noun phrase 
and those that could only possibly be taken to refer to the interpretation of one or 
more clauses. There were 96 instances of the latter. Of those, only 15 ( ~ 1 6 % )  used 
the pronoun it while the other 81 ( 4 4 % )  used either this or that (19 instances of 
that and 62 instances of this). Of the 81 that co-referred with a noun phrase, 79 
(-98%) used it while only 2 (-2%) used this or that. My data comes from Summons 
to Memphis by Peter Taylor, Ballentine Books, 1986; W.D. Hillis' essay, "Intelligence 
as as Emergent Behavior", Daedalus, Winter 1988, pp.175189; an editorial from The 
Guardian, 15 December 1987; two reviews in TLS, 23-29 October 1987, pp.1163- 
1164 and 20-26 November 1987, p.1270; and a technical report "An Architecture for 
Intelligent Reactive Systems" by Leslie Kaebling, SRI Int'l, Menlo Park CA., 1987. 
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